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STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS C. PAPPALARDO and 
HELENA C. PAPPALARDO, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants 
vs. 
PHILIP C. PUGSLEY and 
HARRY D. PUGSLEY, 
Defendants and Respondants, 
APPELLANTS1 BRIEF 
Case No- 14685 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to recover damages against the defendants in 
which plaintiffs allege that defendants were engaged by the plaintiffs to 
answer complaints with the resultant loss of the equities in properties in 
which the defendants failed to protect the record, by answering the Complaints 
which they received from the Plaintiffs. 
No allegations of fraud have ever been made and none were ever 
intended against the defendants. Prior to the plaintiffs' engaging the 
defendants in this action they, the Plaintiffs, had purchased equities in 
six pieces of real property, had made the payments and were renting the properties, 
The plaintiffs then engaged Pacific States Investments Inc. to assist in the 
collection of rents and conveyed their equities in the properties to the 
Pacific States Investments Inc. and in return received a promissory note in the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
amount of $30,000, the same to be paid in $600-a-month payments, and in 
addition thereto the Pacific States Investments Inc. agreed to keep 
current payments that should become due find owing on the contracts of 
purchase; thereafter, the Pacific States Investments Inc. failed to 
keep the contracts current and became in default on all of the contracts. 
Plaintiffs then engaged the defendants to bring an action to set aside 
their conveyances which they had made and recover the properties. Plaintiffs 
allege that upon receipt of notice of the defaults, and upon being served 
with summonses and complaints to foreclose their equities, they took each 
of the notices of defaults, summonses and complaints to the defendants, 
and engaged them to protect the record and recover the equities back for 
them. Plaintiffs allege that they instructed the defendants that they had enough 
equity to refinance the contracts, thereby taking up the defaults and to bring 
each of the contracts current; plaintiffs allege that the defendants assured 
them that they would contact Mr. William G. Cayias, who was the attorney for 
Pacific States Investments, Inc., and they would have them either bring the 
contracts current or file such pleading as defendants deemed proper in order 
to give the plaintiffs time to refinance the contracts and bring them current 
and to set aside the conveyance of the equities which the plaintiffs had made 
to Pacific States Investments, Inc.; thereafter, the defendants did commence 
an action to recover the equities of the plaintiffs and was successful in 
recovering two of the six parcels; as to the remaining four parcels the 
plaintiffs allege that the defendants failed and neglected to answer or 
otherwise plead to the foreclosure actions being brought by the fee holders, 
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and as a result thereof the four pieces of property were lost and the 
plaintiffs thereby suffered damages, together with the loss of the rent 
which they would have recovered. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
After the plaintiffs rested their case, the defendants moved 
for a directed verdict, which motion was thereupon duly granted.lt is from 
the ruling of the Court directing a verdict in favor of the defendant, 
Harry Pugsley and against the plaintiffs this appeal is taken 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek to reverse the ruling of the lower Court in 
which defendants1 motion for a directed verdict was granted as to defendant, 
Harry Pugsley, and to have this Honorable Court order a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
"POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS IN ERROR IN ITS REASON FOR GRANTING A 
DIEECTED VERDICT ON THE GROUND THAT PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO BEAR THE 
BURDEN OF PROOF OF A REASONABLE DUTY OF THE DEFENDANT HARRY PUGSLEY AND 
HAS OFFERED NO EXPERT TESTIMONY TO SUPPORT WHAT THE DUTY WAS. 
The plaintiffs, Thomas Pappalardo (Tr. P. 137, Ls. 25 to 28), 
testified that he first saw Mr. Harry Pugsley concerning a transaction he 
had entered into in which his property was not secured; he had conveyed 
his equity in certain properties to Pacific States Investments, Inc. with 
an agreement that Pacific States Investments, Inc. would collect rents, pay 
the title holders, and after deducting its commission send the balance to 
plaintiffs. After commencing an action for plaintiffs against Pacific States 
Investments, Inc., a stipulation was entered into in which it was recognized 
that the payments were delinquent and the Pacific States Investments, Inc. 
would bring the payments current. (See plaintiffs1 Exhibit 1-P). 
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Plaintiff, Thomas Pappalardo, testified that thereafter and 
subsequent to the stipulation he would receive summonses and complaints 
in which the title holders sought to foreclose plaintiffs' equities. He 
testified that he, with his son-in-law, Paul Sharrot, took the summonses 
and complaints to Mr. Harry Pugsley. Plaintiff told Pugsley in substance 
that he had enough equity in the properties to refinance them and bring 
them current. (Tr. p. 65, Ls. 19 to 28). 
This plaintiff further testified that Mr. Harry Pugsley told 
him "don't be concerned, I will take care of this for you and will give 
you ample time so that you can borrow the money or make arrangements to 
get this money," so these things would be satisfactory with the title 
owners. (Tr. p. 66, Ls). 
Again this plaintiff testified that Mr. Harry Pugsley told 
him that he would talk to Mr. William Cayias, who represented Pacific 
States Investments, Inc. and have Mr. Cayias' client bring the contracts 
current; that if Mr. Cayias failed, defendant Harry Pugsley would file 
a pleading in plaintiffs' behalf that would give them time to refinance 
the properties. (Tr. p. 65, Ls. 19 to 30 - Tr.66 - 1 - 13). Again 
approximately two months later plaintiff went with Mr. Sharrot to the 
office of Mr. Pugsley and talked again about raising the money to keep 
the contracts current. (Tr. pp. 67, 68, 69, 70, 71). 
The substance of all the conversations was that defendant 
Pugsley would call Mr. Cayias to see if the Pacific States Investments, 
Inc., would bring the contracts current; that he would file an answer, or 
otherwise plead to the complaints to avoid defaulting plaintiffs on these 
contracts. This was repeated in cross examination. (Tr. p. 87, Ls. 6 to 14) 
(Tr. 89, Ls. 8 to 13). 
In substance the witness, Paul Sharrot testified to having been 
with the plaintiff, Thomas Pappalardo, and that plaintiff told Mr. Pugsley 
he could raise the money to refinance the defaulting contracts if he could 
have a little time. (Mr. Sharrot - Tr. p. 103, Ls. 18 to 27), "and on all 
of these occasions he did say he would answer these summonses and complaints to 
Pappalardo." It is evident from the subsequent loss of the properties that 
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defendants failed and neglected to answer these summones and complaints. 
Therefore, we respectfully submit that the trial Court in its 
ruling held that plaintiffs had failed to show by expert testimony that 
Mr. Pugsley had a duty to answer the summonses and complaints which 
plaintiff and his son-in-law, Sharrot, delivered to him. . . This does 
not involve a question of whether or not defendants gave proper advice 
and counsel to plaintiffs but simply whether defendant, Harry Pugsley, 
had a duty to answer the complaints when plaintiff, Thomas Pappalardo, 
gave them to defendant, Harry Pugsley, and Mr. Pugsley agreed to file answer. 
In other words it is plaintiffs'simple position that defendants failed to 
file responsive pleadings in accordance with defendant, Harry Pugsleyfs, 
promise to do so and that does not require professional legal testimony 
to establish a duty on the part of defendant to file responsive pleadings. 
This is a changing area of the law. In Gambert v. Hart, 44 Cal 
542 (1872) the Court said in substance that the testimony of an expert 
witness was not admissible as it went to the ultimate fact in issue while 
the question of want of skill of an attorney was a question of law for 
the court. 
Expert evidence as to standards of practice and negligence are 
now generally admissible. The recent case of Starr v. Mooslin, 14 Cal App. 
3d 988, 92 Cal. Reptr 583 stated that the Gambert case did not express 
present law. Reported cases from Maryland, Arkansas, Alabama, and Louisiana 
reveal the same general allowance of expert testimony in legal malpractice 
actions now. 
But the real question is whether the law has turned the arc to 
the point where expert testimony is required for judgment against an 
attorney. The answer seems to be 'sometimes1. The current state of the 
law might best be expressed as follows: 
The law prevailing in some states and there are no Utah cases on 
this point, seems to be that expert testimony as to standards of practice 
and negligence is necessary for the determination of the question. This 
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in Maryland the courts also have held that expert testimony is not 
required where attorney representing the plaintiff made such a clear 
violation of his duty that the trial court could have ruled on it as 
a matter of law. (Central Cab Co. v. Clarke, 259 Md. 542, 270 A.2d 662.) 
In the case of Sanders v. Smith, 83 NM. 706, 496 P.2d 1102 
(1972) The defendant presented the court with three affidavits from 
other attorneys verifying that the course taken by the attorney was 
not negligent. The plaintiff countered with nothing. A motion for 
summary judgment by the defendant was then granted. After confusing 
medical and legal malpractice the court stated that after the defendant 
attorney sustained his burden to establish the absence of a fact issue 
by expert testimony, the plaintiffs could not remain silent. They 
must apprise the court of available expert testimony and then produce 
it. This is saying, in effect, that the prima facie case does not 
require expert testimony; in fact, expert testimony would only be 
required to counter the defendants. In a case later in the same 
year the same need for an expert witness was listed as a requirement 
by the New Mexico court but in this case the attorney was the 
plaintiff claiming that the terms of a contract had been breached 
by the attorney and the breach constituted good cause to dismiss his 
services. (Walters v. Hastings, 84 NM. 101, 500 P.2d 186 (1972).) 
See 17 A.L.R. 2d 1442 at page 1444. 
In the case of Olson vs. North, 276 111. App. 457, wherein 
the Court in discussing the duty owed by an attorney to his client, 
stated (page 473) quoting from a former unpublished opinion: 
"When a person adopts the profession of law, if 
he assumes to exercise the duties in behalf of another 
for hire and regard, he must be held to employ in his 
undertaking a reasonable degree of care and skill. If 
injury results to the client from the want of such a 
degree of reasonable care and skill, he must respond 
in damages to the extent of the injuries sustained. 
It is the duty of an attorney to bring to the conduct 
of his clientfs business the ordinary legal knowledge 
and skill common to members of the legal profession, 
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to act toward his client with the most scrupulous 
good faith and fidelity, and to exercise in the course 
of his employment that reasonable care and diligence 
which is usually exercised by lawyers.11 
In Walkenhorst vs. Kesler, 92 Utah 312, 67 P.2d 654 it is 
stated: 
"The case of Baxter v. Snow, 78 Utah 217, 2 P.(2d)257, 
265, is cited as an authority for the proposition that, 
in the absence of expert testimony on the part of plain-
tiff in malpractice cases, there is not sufficient to take 
the case to the jury. The Baxter-Snow Case is not analo-
gous to the case at bar. The case of Perkins v. True-
blood, 180 Cal. 437, 181. P. 642, is cited. Quoting 
from the case of McGraw v. Kerr, 23 Colo. App. 163, 
128 P. 870, the following is said: 
"Negligence on the part of a physician consists in 
his doing something which he should not have done.*** 
What is or is not proper practice in examination and 
treatment, or the usual practice and treatment, is a 
question for experts and can be established only by 
their testimony." 
The quotation would seem to justify the citation and 
argument. The Baxter v. Snow Case does not, either in 
decision or argument, go so far. It holds the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur does not apply to a malpractice 
case such as the case there under consideration, the 
court saying: 
"We do not say that the rule, as to the necessity 
of expert testimony as stated in the cases referred to, 
applies in all malpractice actions. A treatment may so 
plainly indicate that the physician or surgeon was neg-
ligent, or that an act done or failed to be done so ob-
viously did not involve skill, as not to require any 
opinion of an expert as to the performance or nonper-
formance of the act." 
POINT II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS IN ERROR IN ITS SECOND FINDING. 
THAT THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW 
TO WARRANT A FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFFS HAD BEEN DAMAGED 
AS A RESULT OF LEGAL SERVICES PERFORMED OR NOT PERFORMED 
BY THE DEFENDANTS. 
-8-
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Judge Hall in his ruling and comments from the bench stated: 
(Tr. p. 137 Is. 25 to 30 - p. 138 Is. 1 and 2) "The Court is of the 
opinion that the plaintiffs have failed to bear the burden of proof here 
as to the reasonable duty of the defendant Harry Pugsley, and has 
offered no expert testimony to support what the duty was; and further 
that the plaintiff has failed to bear the burden of proof as to 
proximate cause in this matter and for those reasons the Court grants 
the motion also for a direct verdict to Mr. Harry Pugsley." 
In this case the whole case involves the question of 
whether or not the defendants performed their duty for which they were 
hired, to-wit, to file responsive pleadings when Plaintiff, Thomas 
Pappalardo, brought Summonses and Complaints to defendant, Harry 
Pugsley. Mr. Pugsley stated that he received four summonses and 
answered two of them (Tr. p. 132, Ls. 2 to 4). Again Mr, Pugsley 
stated that he turned two of the Summonses over to Mr. Cayias. 
(Tr. p. 132, Ls. 4 to 13). This of course corresponds to the testi-
mony of Plaintiff, Thomas Pappalardo, and Mr. Sharrot that Mr. Pugsley 
said he would contact Mr. Cayias. We submit again that Mr. Pugsleyfs 
testimony that he handed the Summonses, together with the claims, 
over to Mr. Cayias, and that the actions were defaulted by Mr. Pugsley's 
failure to answer the Complaints for which he was hired, was the sole 
and proximate cause of the injury and resultant damage and loss to 
Plaintiffs. 
In 14 C.J.S. p. 41, causation is defined as follows: ffIt has 
been said that where the act is the failure to perform or the 
omission of a legal duty, causation is established when the doing 
of the act would have prevented the result.If 
See also Harvard Law Review 633, 637. 
In 86 C.J.S., p. 941 §27, it is stated at page 941 as follows: 
"Generally, a tort-feasor is liable for the natural 
and proximate consequences of his act, but unless the 
act complained of is the proximate cause of the 
injury, there is no legal liability 
-9-
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"In determining liability for a tortious injury, the 
law looks only to the act or omission from which the result 
follows in direct sequence without the intervention of a 
voluntary independent cause and declines to permit further 
investigation into the chain of events, and, unless the act 
complaining of is the proximate cause of the injury, there 
is no legal liability. * * * 
nTo constitute proximate cause under the rule of many 
decisions the injury must be the natural and probable con-
sequence of the wrong, that is, such a consequence as, under 
the surrounding circumstances of the case, might or ought to 
have been foreseen as likely to flow from the wrong, or, as 
it has been stated, a proximate cause is a cause that produces 
the result in continuous sequence and without which it would 
not have occured, and one from which anyone of ordinary prudence 
could have foreseen that such a result was probable under the 
facts as they existed. The particular result need not have 
been foreseen so long as the wrongdoer might have foreseen that 
some injury might result.11 
We therefore submit that the act of omission as alleged by 
Plaintiffs in Defendant, Harry Pugsley's failure to answer Plaintiffs' 
Complaint or at least file a pleading to give Plaintiffs an opportunity 
to raise the money to bring the contracts current was the sole and proximate 
cause of the loss to Plaintiffs as set forth in their Complaint. There was 
no other matter involved in this action and particularly in the State of 
the record when the Court directed a verdict. Had this Defendant done that 
for which he was hired and paid a retainer, Plaintiffs would have no claim 
against this Defendant. Further, this simple fact should not require the 
Plaintiff to prove by professional testimony that an attorney should file 
an Answer to a Complaint when he is hired for that purpose. 
On expert testimony, see also Crouch v. Most, 78 N.M. 406, 
432 P.2d 250 (1967); Schrib v. Seidenberg, 80 N.M. 573, 458 P.2d 825 
(Ct.App. 1969); Binns v. Schoenbrun, 81 N.M. 489, 468 P. 2d 890 (Ct. App. 1970) 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ITS RULING REGARDING THE ADMISSIBILITY 
OF EVIDENCE WHICH PLAINTIFFS ATTEMPTED TO ELICIT FROM DEFENDANTS. 
-10-
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Plaintiffs1 counsel asked the question (Tr. 128 Line 7-10): 
"If he stated to you that he could raise the money, if he could get a little 
more time", isn't it a fact from your general practice, you would protect 
the record by filing some kind of pleadings to give him more time, if he 
told you that?" Mr. Hanson thereupon made an objection in substance that 
Plaintiff had not specified the amount he was talking about and therefore it 
would be improper to make a valid defense and he (defendant) would have 
to know the amount of the money before he could answer that question 
(Tr.128, Lines 11 to 30). The discussion that followed and the ruling by 
the Court, we respectfully submit was in error. The simple question asked by 
counsel to precipitate such a discussion and ruling could and should have 
been answered with a simple "Yes" or "No". 
Again, the Court, we submit was in error in its ruling as to the 
admissibility of the evidence regarding whether or not Defendant, Harry 
Pugsley, had taken the Complaints to Mr. Cayias instead of answering them. 
(Tr. 130, Lines 1-28). Mr. Pappalardo had testified that Defendant, Harry 
Pugsley, had received the summonses from him, the Plaintiff, and had stated 
that he would talk to Mr. Cayias about having the contracts brought current 
or in the alternative that he would file a pleading in behalf of Plaintiff 
that would give Plaintiff time to refinance his properties. (Tr. 66, 
Lines 1-30). Defendant denied that he had agreed to answer the Complaints. 
The direct question was asked Defendant who was an adverse witness: (Tr.130, 
Lines 4-14): 
Question by Mr. Duncan: But didn't Mr. Pappalardo ask you to 
defend those suits? 
Answer: No. He did not, those other two — those others. 
Question: But didn't he bring them to you? 
Answer: He brought them into the office, yes. 
Question: And you instead took it to his opponents? 
MR. HANSON: Well now, just a second, I object to that question 
as a characterization of Mr. Cayias being an opponent. Mr. Cayias' client was 
an obligor and I object to this as being argumentative in addition. 
-11-
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THE COURT: The objection is sustained. 
This testimony was in direct conflict with that of Plaintiff 
as herein set forth and the Court should have left the question of validity 
of the testimony to the Jurey. 
SUMMARY 
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the Court erred in directing 
the verdict for the following reason: 
The District Court ruled in this case that the Plaintiff had 
failed to prove that the conduct of the Defendant in failing to answer 
the Complaints and Summonses which the Plaintiff handed to him, was not in 
accordance with the general standard of practice in this area and that the 
Plaintiff had failed to prove this fact by professional testimony. 
We respectfully submit that the rule requiring professional 
testimony as to the general standard of practice in this area regarding 
attorneys handling matters for their clients is not applicable in this case. 
Plaintiffs' Complaint against the Defendant was not misinformation, 
misjudgment, or any misconduct on the part of Defendant, Harry Pugsley, as 
one of Plaintiffs1 attorneys. The only question involved was whether Defend-
ant, Harry Pugsley, failed in his agreement to answer the Complaints which 
the Plaintiff, Thomas Pappalardo, states he delivered to Mr. Pugsley and 
was assured by Mr. Pugsley that he would answer the same or file pleading 
that would give Plaintiff time in which to refinance the properties and 
bring the contracts current before the default was entered. In other words, 
do the Courts of Utah require professional testimony to prove that an 
attorney should answer a complaint when he receives the copy of the 
summons and complaint and is paid a retainer for his services. We think 
not and submit that this involved merely a simple breach of a contract to 
answer the complaint when he is hired and paid to do so. The failure to 
answer the complaints with the resultant defaults and loss of plaintiffs' 
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
properties and the damage thereby suffered is so plain and obvious that 
the failure can be recognized and inferred from common knowledge or 
experience of laymen without the aid of expert witnesses. We have cited 
herein authorities so holding and submit that the proposition that there 
need be professional testimony that the standard of practice in this 
area requires professional proof that an attorney who is hired and paid 
a retainer of $1,000.00 to answer a complaint must do so, just does not 
make common sense. 
As to Point II and the Court's comment that plaintiff has 
failed to bear the burdon of proof as to the reasonable duty of Defendant, 
Harry Pugsley, to answer the complaints plaintiff gave to him to answer, 
we submit that the case at bar is just a plain case of failure on the part 
of this defendant to do that for which he was paid; to answer the complaints 
served on plaintiffs. Plaintiffs claim no fraud, misrepresentation or poor 
or improper advice or misjudgment in handling the matters for which defend-
ants were hired, but merely that defendant, Harry Pugsley, failed or neglec-
ted to answer the complaints. Plaintiffs are at a loss to understand in 
view of the evidence submitted, that the trial Court can hold that plain-
tiffs have failed to sustain the burden of proof as to the proximate cause 
of the matter of which plaintiffs complain. 
As to Point III, plaintiffs respectfully submit that the ruling 
of the Court precluded plaintiffs from establishing further by way of 
testimony of defendant, Harry Pugsley, who was an adverse witness, that the 
defendant had failed in his duty to answer the complaint for which he was 
hired. 
In this case at least upon the state of the records when 
plaintiffs rested, we submit there is no daubt that the cause of action 
and claim which plaintiffs have asserted would not have arisen had defendant, 
Harry Pugsley, answered the complaints for which plaintiffs allege he was 
hired. 
-13-
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1 
We therefore respectfully submit that plaintiffs are entitled 
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